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This study investigates the effects of an improvement in female autonomy on children’s 
welfare in the developing world, taking into consideration intra-household resource 
allocation through decision-making processes within households. Using a female 
autonomy index constructed from India’s 1998/99 National Family Health Survey, the study 
tries to capture women’s bargaining power and examine the effects on children’s health and 
medical condition. The results of the empirical analysis suggest that often, though not 
always, children’s health and medical condition can be enhanced by improving female 
autonomy. In addition, the results also imply that fostering female autonomy may play a 
crucial role in achieving economic development from a long-term perspective. 
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1. Introduction 
One of the principal objectives of this paper is to explore the effects of improvements in 
female autonomy  –  that is, improvements in the bargaining power of women within 
households through decision-making processes – on children’s welfare by using a micro 
dataset from India. As the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) list promoting gender 
equality and empowering  women as the third goal out of  eight  and reducing child 
mortality as the fourth, the analysis in  this paper provides important  implications  for 
development policies. 
It is widely recognized that women in developing countries often have a lower social 
status than men.  Often,  women  do not  have  access to  health care services or  equal 
education opportunities and lack economic opportunities inside and outside their home. 
Inadequate health care for women can result in  early mortality;  a lack of schooling 
perpetuates their  low status, and  fewer  economic opportunities cause a variety  of 
disadvantages. In India, which this paper focuses on, the disadvantages faced by women 
are often particularly severe: they often do not have a say even within their home, let alone 
enjoy equal education or economic opportunities outside their home. 
India is well known not only  for  its  large  population, but also  for  the  peculiar 
demographic composition of its population. In developed countries, it is usually men that 
die earlier than women, so that in general the population of women is larger than that of 
men. This is the natural pattern one observes when women and men enjoy equal levels of 
access to nutrition and health care. In contrast, in India there are more men than women, 
reflecting a higher mortality rate among women. The sex ratio in India was 971 in 1901, but 
has declined since then and in recent decades has been hovering around 930 (935 in 1981,   3 
927 in 1991, and 933 in 2001).1  Although differences in mortality and education between 
the sexes have recently been  gradually decreasing, women  still face disadvantages.  As 
argued by Dréze and Sen (2002), deprivation of women in India remains deep-rooted.2
In addition, there are other serious problems for women. For example, women are 
often not even allowed to go out freely and, furthermore, seldom take part in household 
decision-making processes, let alone their own marriage. In most cases, they have no say in 
when or who they are to marry. In addition, they often have little say in when to bear 
children, and how many, once they are married. Thus, women in India face  serious 
deprivation in that the extent to which they can make their own decisions is confined to 
narrow limits.   
 
For reasons such as these, the empowerment of women in the developing world has 
been a key policy goal, especially since the Beijing Women’s Conference in 1995 (Anderson 
and Eswaran, 2009). Enhancing the  decision-making power of women in developing 
countries is considered to be one of the most important components in the empowerment 
of women. From the viewpoint of economics, decision-making power corresponds to 
bargaining power. Another way to describe this is in term of “female autonomy,” since the 
bargaining power  of women  refers to  the extent to which women  can take part in 
decision-making processes within households and act according to their own free will. 
In addition to the problem of women’s low status, India still suffers from persistent 
deprivation of children. According to the National Family Health Survey, the child mortality 
rate (CMR), one of the most important indicators of children’s welfare, was 109.3 per mil in 
1992/93, 94.9 in 1998/99, and 74.3 in 2005/06 (IIPS and ORC Macro, 2007). There is no doubt 
                                                   
1  In India, the sex ratio is generally calculated as the ratio of females to males. Following 
this practice, this study shows sex ratio as the number of women for 1,000 men. 
2  See also, e.g., Bardhan (1974; 1982), Kishor (1993) and Murthi, Guio, and Dréze (1995).   4 
that there is still plenty of room for improvement in nutrition and health care for children 
in India, considering that the CMR is around 10 per mil or less in developed countries. 
Children are the most vulnerable to poverty (Rosenzweig and Schultz, 1982) and usually 
do not have the means to protect themselves. In some developing countries, the CMR is 
over 100 per mil even today, so this is a big issue to be tackled by international society, as 
seen in the  MDGs.  Hence, this paper pays attention to how  female autonomy affects 
children’s welfare in India.   
In economic studies, households are usually treated as one economic unit since data 
on individual household members are rarely available. Employing what are called unitary 
household models, such studies therefore assume that all decisions within a household are 
made by a “dictator”  or that all household members have the same preferences.3  A 
number of scholars, however, have suggested that households  should be regarded  as 
non-unitary, consisting of a plurality of members with different preferences. This is backed 
by empirical studies which indicate that individual household members have a variety of 
different preferences and therefore affect intra-household resource allocation in different 
ways. Thomas (1990), for example, using a micro data set of Brazil, showed that wives and 
husbands influenced decision-making processes within households differently. And in an 
empirical study on Burkina Faso, Udry (1996) found  that  the  marginal agricultural 
productivity of each household member differs and that the assumption of the unitary 
household model is not adequate.4
                                                   
3  In collective models of household behavior, it is assumed that while all household 
members have different preferences, the economic behavior of the household is efficient. 
See Browning et al (1994). 
   
4  Other empirical studies on non-unitary household models include Schultz (1990), 
Browning et al. (1994), Lundberg, Pollak, and Wales (1997), Fuwa et al. (2006), etc. A 
particularly notable study is that by Qian (2008), which examines the unitary household 
hypothesis through an empirical analysis of the effect of a rise in female income on the sex   5 
Additionally, if resources are allocated disproportionately  among household 
members, it is likely that the outcomes of policy interventions will differ from what policy 
makers expect. Haddad and Kanbur (1990), for example, found that poverty is likely to be 
underestimated if there are intra-household variations in welfare. Similar ly, Beaton and 
Ghassemi (1982) showed that school feeding programs aimed at improving child nutrition 
and school enrollment failed to bring about the expected positive outcomes because such 
programs  resulted in  changes in  intra-household resource allocation. As these studies 
demonstrate, it is essential to pay attention to intra-household resource allocation behavior 
because often expected policy goals may not be achieved under the assumption of a unitary 
household.5
In fact, the intra-household allocation of resources and specifically the enhancement 
of women’s bargaining power within households is one of the most important factors in 
improving  household welfare  and, by extension, achieving development as shown by 
Thomas (1990), Lundberg, Pollak, and Wales (1997), and Eswaran (2002).
   
6
                                                                                                                                                     
ratio and gender differences in school enrollment. 
  However, these 
studies only indirectly examined the effects of improvements in women’s bargaining power 
on household welfare.  And while Kantor (2003) and Anderson and Eswaran (2009) 
investigated what factors potentially contribute to improvements in women’s bargaining 
power they did not explore how that influences household welfare. Thus, as far as I am 
aware, there are no studies that directly examine the effect of improvements in women’s 
bargaining power on household welfare. 
5  On this point, also see the survey by Alderman et al. (1995). 
6  It should be noted that it is possible to examine the intra-household resource allocation 
under the assumption of the unitary household model. Some studies, including a 
representative study by Rosenzweig and Schultz (1982), attempt to examine the 
intra-household resource allocation under the assumption of the unitary household model. 
See also Pitt and Rosenzweig (1990) and Pitt, Rosenzweig, and Hassan (1990), etc.   6 
Against this background, the present study focuses on female autonomy –  a key 
element in the empowerment of women – and assumes it is closely related to bargaining 
power. In other words, the effects of female autonomy are examined using a proxy for the 
bargaining power of women. This makes it possible to identify the effects  of female 
autonomy on children’s welfare that previous studies did not directly investigate. One of 
the principal objectives of this paper is to explore the effects  of improvements  in  the 
bargaining power of women within  households  through decision-making processes  on 
children’s welfare. 
In the empirical analysis in this paper, the 1998/99 National Family Health Survey, a 
micro dataset that contains some variables related to female autonomy, is employed. In fact, 
the National Family Health Survey has been conducted three times：  the first was conducted 
in 1992/93 (NFHS-1), the second in 1998/99 (NFHS-2), and the third (the latest) in 2005/06 
(NFHS-3). The reasons for using the NFHS-2 rather than the NFHS-1 or the NFHS-3 are 
that the NFHS-1 does not contain variables related to female autonomy, while the NFHS-3 
does not contain socio-economic variables at village level. The female autonomy index is 
constructed from the NFHS-2 and the effects on children’s welfare are directly examined. 
The reminder of this study is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a description of 
the data used and explains how the female autonomy index is constructed. The theoretical 
and empirical models for the analyses are then presented in Section 3, while Section 4 
presents the estimation results. Section 5 concludes. 
 
2. Data 
2.1 Key features of the data 
The data employed in this paper are from the  1998/99  National Family Health Survey   7 
(NFHS-2).7  The survey was conducted in 26 states in India based on interviews with 
married women aged between 15 and 49. 8  Questions about  the  health and medical 
condition of married women and their children form a central part of the survey. It is worth 
noting that the survey contains a section on the “status of women.”9
The deprivation of women and children in India can be observed from the NFHS-2 in 
terms of demography and educational achievement. The child mortality rate (CMR), a vital 
statistic significantly affecting demography, for example, is 115 per mil in Rajasthan in the 
north, and 138 in Uttar Pradesh and 123 in Madhya Pradesh (both in central India). In 
contrast, the CMR is 19 in Kerala in the south. The proportion of women with a child aged 
0-4  that had taken the at least once to a  medical facility  during the 12-month-period 
preceding the survey is 39 percent in Rajasthan, 47 percent in Madhya Pradesh, and 88 
percent in Kerala.
  This section consists 
of five broad topics that are subdivided into 13 detailed questions, while other sections also 
contain some questions related to female autonomy.   
10
The total fertility rate (TFR) is regarded as a vital statistic that is closely related to the 
CMR. In the context of economic  development, high fertility is often considered to be 
problematic because it tends to be one manifestation of women’s low status; that is, women 
in the developing world often have no say about whether to have children, resulting in 
repeated childbearing.  Having many children can be  a heavy burden on women and 
   
                                                   
7  The NFHS data can be downloaded from the Demographic and Health Surveys website 
(http://www.measuredhs.com/).   
8  In Tripura, one of the northeastern states, the survey was conducted later than in the 
other states of India. Therefore, most previous empirical studies exclude Tripura from their 
analysis and this paper follows this practice. 
9  In the basic survey report for the NFHS-2 (IIPS and ORC Macro, 2000), these variables are 
examined in section 6, “Women’s Autonomy,” in chapter 3. 
10  The vital statistics in this subsection are based on the NFHS-2 report (IIPS, 2000).   8 
negatively affect their health (Sen, 1999). In India, fertility tends to be relatively high: the 
TFR in Rajasthan, for example, is 3.78, while that in Madhya Pradesh is 3.31. In contrast, in 
Kerala, it is only 1.96, indicating that considerable differences can be found across states.   
As for education, we can easily observe gender disparities, as well as regional 
differences. The median of schooling years is 0.0 for women and 3.6 for men in Bihar in the 
east, 0.0 and 4.8 respectively  in Madhya Pradesh  in the central,  and  4.5 and 6.4  in 
Tamil-Nadu and 7.6 and 8.1 in Kerala in the south. In addition to these gender disparities, 
educational attainment also greatly varies within states. It is said that these figures reflect 
women’s status in each state and consequently demography and educational attainment in 
India differ considerably from state to state, as discussed in previous studies (see, e.g., 
Bardhan, 1974; 1982; Dyson and Moore, 1983; Das Gupta, 1987). This geographical diversity 
means that  the cross-sectional analysis in this study  potentially  provides  important 
information for development policies. 
The figures presented here are calculated using all observations, both for urban and 
rural areas. However, poverty in India is more severe in rural areas (Van der Klaauw and 
Wang, 2005). For instance, according to the NFHS-2, the CMR is 115.5 per mil in rural areas 
compared with 65.4 in urban areas. As for education, the Census of India 2001 shows that the 
literacy rate in rural areas is only 59.2 percent compared with 80.1 percent in urban areas. 
These figures indicate that although the disparities between rural and urban areas have 
decreased over the decades, they are still substantial. Hence, this paper concentrates only 
on rural areas. The number of observations is 62,248 for rural areas, while the total number 
of observations is 89,199.11
                                                   
11  It should be noted that the number of observations used in the analysis below is less than 
the total number of observations. The reasons are that Tripura – as already mentioned in 
footnote 8 – is omitted from the analysis and that the analysis focus only on women with 
     9 
 
2.2 Female autonomy 
The NFHS-2 includes a number of questions related to female autonomy. In this paper, 
these questions, which ask  married women  whether  they  participate  in  household 
decision-making  processes, are used  to construct  dummy variables employed for the 
empirical analysis. Specifically, the following eight questions from the NFHS-2 are used: 
 
-  In the last few months, have you discussed the practice of family planning with your 
husband? 
-  Who makes a decision on what items to cook? 
-  Who makes a decision on obtaining health care for yourself? 
-  Who makes a decision on purchasing jewelry or other major household items? 
-  Who makes a decision on your going and staying with parents or siblings? 
-  Do you need permission to go to the market? 
-  Do you need permission to visit relatives or friends? 
-  Are you allowed to have some money set aside that you can use as you wish? 
 
Some of these questions allow the following multiple-choice answers: (1) respondent 
(wife) decides, (2) husband decides, (3) jointly with husband, (4) someone else decides, or 
(5) jointly with someone else. In this paper, the dummy variable constructed from the these 
questions  take  a value of 1  –  indicating that the  wife takes part in household 
decision-making in one way or another  –  if the answer is (1), (3), or (5). The  dummy 
variables are then used to construct a female autonomy (FA) index, which is obtained by 
                                                                                                                                                     
children.   10 
simply summing up these eight dummy variables. Of course, the FA index constructed here 
is not without problems. A key issue in this regard is the eight dummy variables and how 
the replies to the individual questions are to be judged. For instance, a key question from 
an economic viewpoint is the one asking “Are you allowed to have some money set aside 
that you can use as you wish?” The percentage of women replying that they are, at 55.8 
percent is unexpectedly high, raising the question how the term “money” is interpreted by 
respondents. Moreover, it could be argued that some of the issues addressed by the 
questions are more important than others; yet, it would be difficult to rank them in 
importance.12
The average values of the FA index for India as a whole, for rural and urban areas, 
and for the rural areas of different states are provided in Table 1.  As can be seen, the 
average value for India as a whole is 3.89, but this hides a substantial discrepancy between 
rural areas, for which it is 3.63, and urban areas, for which it is 4.49. Turning to differences 
between states, it is often agued that the status of women is higher in the south than in the 
north (see, e.g., Dyson and Moore, 1983). Yet, the FA index figures suggest that the pattern 
is less clear-cut. For example, the FA index is only 2.82 in Rajasthan, but 5.08 in Punjab 
indicating a large discrepancy even among northern states. And turning to the southern 
states, the FA index ranges from 3.57 for Andhra Pradesh to 5.01 for Tamil-Nadu. These 
results indicate that in order to understand the determinants of female autonomy, a more 
careful, statistical analysis  is needed, taking into consideration characteristics of 
households, communities, local economic conditions, and socio-cultural environments.   
  In the construction of the FA index employed here, the eight dummy 
variables are therefore given equal weight for simplicity. 
 
                                                   
12  In addition, it also should be borne in mind that three out of the eight questions are 
about whether women are allowed to leave the house.   11 
[Table 1] 
 
Examining the distribution of FA index values (not shown) indicates that this is 
relatively symmetric and the truncation at both ends seems sufficiently small to neglect. 
Given these observations, for the purpose of the empirical analysis in this paper, the FA 
index is assumed to be a continuous variable. However, as mentioned above, it should be 
noted that the FA index is not without problems.13
 
 
3. The model 
As mentioned earlier, a key purpose of the analysis in this paper is to take into account the 
possibility that  household members have different preferences and affect  household 
decision-making processes differently. In particular, the effects of wives’ bargaining power 
vis-à-vis their  husband are considered.  Following Eswaran (2002), an asymmetric Nash 
bargaining solution is assumed. The maximization problem for households thus can be 
represented as follows: 
 
( ) [ ] ( ) [ ]
I qz px
V y z x U V y z x U
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    (1) 
 
where U denotes the utility function of spouses and superscripts f and m denote the wife 
and the husband, respectively. V0 is the threat utility that represents the utility of the wife 
or the husband in the scenario when negotiation breaks down. x is the set of private goods 
                                                   
13  For instance, Kerala, where it is often said that the status of women is higher than in the 
other states, ranks tenth among 25. This indicates that it cannot be ruled out that the 
methodology for constructing the female autonomy index is not without problems.   12 
that the wife and the husband own, z is children’s welfare as a public good, p is the set of 
prices of private goods, and q is the cost of maintenance of children’s welfare. γ represents 
the relative power of the wife vis-à-vis the husband that is attributed to their preferences 
for bargaining,14  and I refers to the household income. Female autonomy in this study is 
assumed to inclusively reflect V0 and γ.15
 
  The solution to this maximization problem is as 
follows: 
( )
m f m f y y I q p p z z , , , , , =     (2). 
 
An empirical model  is  derived  from  this theoretical model. As noted earlier,  this 
study  tries to identify  factors that influence children’s welfare as outcomes  of  the 
intra-household resource allocation,  paying  particular  attention to  female autonomy. 
Moreover, this study explores the effects of female autonomy on the children’s health and 
medical condition,  which  are used as proxies  for  children’s  welfare.  Specifically,  the 
following  two variables are employed: whether a  wife  had  at least one child that died 
before the age of 5 (CD), and whether a wife had taken her children to a medical facility of 
any kind to receive health care during the 12-month-period preceding the survey (CC). In 
other words, CD is an indicator concerned with child survival, while CC is an indicator 
                                                   
14  Binmore, Rubinstein, and Wolinsky (1986) pointed out that γ emerges because people 
have differences in time preferences and estimates of the likelihood of breakdown in 
negotiations. In this case, γ is presented by the ratio of time preferences or estimates of the 
probability of breakdown of bargaining. Eswaran (2002) argues that an increase in the 
parameter γ, which would be associated with a cultural shift to more favorable kinship 
systems, can certainly be construed as empowering women. 
15  Fuwa et al. (2006) argued that extra-environmental parameters (EEPs) probably affect 
bargaining power. Examples of EEPs include the local sex ratio, divorce law legislation, and 
the degree of prohibition on market work by gender (Fuwa et al., 2006). It is important to 
note that the NFHS-2 lacks such information.   13 
related to routine health care for children.  CD and CC are separately analyzed as 
dependent variables. 
Next, it should be noted that female autonomy itself is affected by a variety of factors 
such as the wife’s and the husband’s education and income, household characteristics, and 
socio-economic conditions in the village that the household belongs to (Kantor, 2003; Basu, 
2006; Anderson and Eswaran, 2009). Therefore, a simultaneous equation model is 
employed for the empirical analysis in this study, consisting of two functions of female 




    (3) 
 
 
where f denotes female autonomy,16  z* is the latent variable that represents the health 
and medical condition of the family’s children, and X is a set of exogenous variables. 
Note that at least one instrumental variable is necessary for the first equation to be 
identified.  For this model to be correctly estimated,  this instrumental  variable  is 
required to control for the effects on female autonomy without affecting the health and 
medical condition of children. The instrumental variable employed here is a dummy 
indicating whether a wife has the opportunity either to watch TV or listen to the radio 
at least once a week (MEDIA).17
                                                   
16  It is assumed that f inclusively represents V0 and γ. 
  This choice of variable is based on the argument, put 
17  OLS estimation confirms that this variable avoids the weak instrument problem. See 
also the estimation result in Table 4. 
otherwise     0
0    if      1
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forward, for example, by Jensen and Oster (2009), that TV and radio expose rural 
households to urban lifestyles, values, and patterns of behavior, which may then begin 
to adopt or emulate them and consequently change their behavior and way of thinking. 
However, it is also possible that TV and radio programs include information on 
health and medical care for children. In order to control for this and ensure that the 
MEDIA variable is a valid instrument, a dummy variable is employed that takes 1 
when a wife either watched or listened to programs on family planning in the month 
prior to the survey (MEDIA-HEALTH). In fact, to address issues such as India’s high 
child mortality and fertility, the government provides  guidelines for  promoting  the 
spread of information  not only on  family planning, but also on parenthood, 
reproductive health, and the survival and health of children, through various media 
(see, e.g., Government of India, 1993). 18
Other  potential  problems with regard to the instrumental variable  include the 
following. First, there could be reverse causality between female autonomy and MEDIA; 
that is, greater female autonomy is likely to increase opportunities for exposure to TV and 
radio. In this case, MEDIA does not satisfy exogeneity,  which  is needed for  a  valid 
instrument. According to an empirical study on women’s status and cable TV in India by 
Jensen and Oster (2009), the introduction of cable for TV in rural areas was determined by 
considering the access to electricity and the distance to the nearest town or city, increased 
the opportunities for women to watch TV, and consequently led to improvements in the 
status of women. Given these findings, this study assumes that MEDIA is exogenously 
  It  is  therefore assumed here  that 
MEDIA-HEALTH successfully controls for the  direct effects of such public health 
campaigns on CD and CC. 
                                                   
18  Means to disseminate such information include not only TV programs such as song and 
drama programs but also films and print media produced by the government.   15 
determined.19
Before embarking  on the empirical investigation  in the following  section,  another 
limitation of the analysis should be mentioned. It should be noted that the NFHS-2 does 
not contain any information on the threat utility V0 in equation (1), for example unearned 
income,  which  could greatly influence household members’  bargaining power and 
behavior, so  an  empirical analysis  excluding  V0  may result in  biased estimates.
  Second, MEDIA may suffer from endogeneity problems because CD and CC 
may be influenced by other socio-economic factors. For example, it is likely that affluent 
regions, where people have many opportunities to watch TV and listen to the radio, also 
have better medical facilities. The analysis attempts to control for this effect by adding as 
many  socio-economic variables as possible.  The  third  potential problem is correlation 
between MEDIA and MEDIA-HEALTH. However, at 0.65, the correlation is not that large. 
For these reasons, it is assumed here that MEDIA satisfies the necessary conditions for an 
instrumental variable.   
20  It is 
indispensable for bargaining models  to take into consideration a threat scenario  that 
describes the situation that occurs when bargaining breaks down,  and  in most studies 
focusing on bargaining among couples the assumed threat scenario is divorce, so the assets 
that each the wife and the husband own are regarded as V0. Unfortunately, the NFHS-2 
contains no information that would allow constructing a variable representing such an 
outcome, so it should be noted that in this paper it is impossible to examine what the threat 
scenario is.21
                                                   
19  It should be noted, though, that the MEDIA variable also includes the opportunity to 
listen to the radio, so it differs somewhat from the situation examined by Jensen and Oster 
(2009). 
 
20  It also should be noted that the absence of important factors that influence the threat 
utilities of wives and husbands, such as extra-environmental parameters (EEPs), could 
cause the same problem as the absence of V0.   
21  However, as shown in the empirical study on Bangladesh by Anderson and Eswaran   16 
The absence of important factors that influence  the  threat utilities of wives  and 
husbands may potentially cause an omitted variable bias. For instance, it is possible that 
unearned income of wives is positively correlated with female autonomy. If this is the case, 
omitting V0 would cause upward bias with regard to the effect of female autonomy in the 
second regression, since it would result in a positive correlation between the FA index and 
the error term in the first regression. On the other hand, unearned income of husbands may 
be negatively correlated with female autonomy, which would lead to downward bias in the 
effect of female autonomy in the second regression. Hence, the direction of the overall bias 
would depend on the magnitude of these different individual biases.   
To address the problem of the absence of  V0,  dummies  for wives’  and husbands’ 
occupation are used as an alternative. These dummies are expected to resolve  the 
difficulties  mentioned above to some extent. However, it  should  be  noted  that  the 
occupation dummies  for  women  could be endogenous. If  these dummy variables are 
endogenous, that is, if greater female autonomy increases the likelihood of labor market 
participation or affects women’s vocational choice, this might lead to an overestimation of 
the effects of these dummies on female autonomy, since they would be positively correlated 
with u1. Thus, the theoretical value of female autonomy could be overestimated. In that 
case, therefore, it is expected that the effect of female autonomy on children’s welfare could 
have an attenuation bias. In fact,  the  occupation dummies could  also be influenced by 
factors other than female autonomy such as husbands’ occupation and income, household 
wealth, and socio-cultural factors. These would be negatively correlated with u1, so the net 
magnitude  of the bias is  ambiguous.  Although these dummies  are considered to be 
                                                                                                                                                     
(2009), in a South Asian context, a valid threat scenario instead of divorce would be a 
non-cooperative outcome within marriage. Also, in India, couples rarely ever divorce. The 
NFHS-2 data, for example, indicate that of the 61,337 surveyed women in rural areas, only 
238 were divorced and single.     17 
independent  here due to  the  difficulties  of  finding appropriate instrumental variables, 
these issues should be borne in mind. However, as will be seen later, when conducting the 
estimation without the occupation dummies, the results are qualitatively almost the same. 
Tables 2 and 3 provide summary statistics for the variables used in the empirical 
analysis. Two dependent variables, CD and CC, are employed as proxies representing the 
health and medical condition of children, while female autonomy, as noted above, is used 
as an endogenous regressor. Variables representing characteristics of couples  and 
households, socio-economic and environmental features of the village households belong 
to, and the instrumental variable are employed as explanatory variables. As for 
socio-economic and environmental variables, all the available variables are made use of so 
as to avoid the problem of omitted variable bias, though the number of explanatory 






4. Estimation results 
This section presents the estimation results.22
                                                   
22  The estimation in this paper is conducted making use of the ivprobit command in 
STATA. 
  It should be noted that while the 
sample for the analysis of CD – the possibility that a wife had at least one child who died 
before age 5 – consists of 51,023 wives, and that for the analysis of CC is limited to 31,866 
wives. The reason is that CC focuses on whether a wife took one or more of her children 
aged below 5 to receive health care at a medical facility in the 12 months preceding the   18 
survey, thus limiting the sample to wives who had children aged under 5 at the time of the 
survey. 23  In addition, the NFHS-2 does not provide any information on the assets owned 
by each household member but owned by the household (ASSETS). So the variable ASSETS 
is used as a proxy for the household economic situation.24
Table 4 presents the estimation results for FA from the first stage regression. They 
show that wives’  exposure to TV and radio, represented by the MEDIA instrumental 
variable, has a significant positive  effect on female autonomy.  This suggests that the 
bargaining power of wives within the household improves as a result of the information 
and ideas they gain through media exposure. Similarly, the coefficient on 
MEDIA-HEALTH is significantly positive, implying that wives may come to form their 
own  opinion  through  contemplating  the  health and medical condition of their family 
members. 




Looking at the effects of education, the number of wives’ years of schooling has a 
significant positive effect on female autonomy. This means that greater  educational 
attainment for wives helps to raise their bargaining power within the household. Turning 
to the impact of being engaged in work, all coefficients on occupation dummies for the wife 
are positive, indicating that working raises female autonomy. On the other hand, many of 
                                                   
23  In the analysis of CC, it is possible that the inclusion of women who bore their first child 
less than 5 years prior to the survey could produce biased estimates. Therefore, to check the 
robustness of the result, the regression was repeated excluding such women. The results 
were qualitatively the same. 
24  ASSETS, which takes a value ranging from 1 to 61, is calculated following the 
methodology for the Standard Living Index in the NFHS-2.     19 
the occupation dummies for the husband have a negative coefficient, which is particularly 
large and significant for agricultural laborers  and cultivators. This implies that in 
households in which the husband is engaged in agriculture, the bargaining power of wives 
tends to be relatively weak and their opportunities for participating in decision-making 
processes in the home to be small. 
Next, Tables 5 and 6 present the estimation results relating to children’s welfare. They 
indicate that while FA has no significant effect on CD, it does have a significant positive 
effect on CC, indicating that one additional point in the FA index increases CC by 38.6 
percent  (36.2  percent). These results suggest that an  improvement  in the  FA  index 
significantly raises the likelihood that a mother will take her child to a medical facility, but 






As for the impact of education on children’s welfare, wives’ and husbands’ years of 
schooling have  a significant negative effect on CD, indicating that an  improvement  in 
wives’ and husbands’ education tends to decrease the likelihood of child death. On the 
other hand, the estimation results  for  CC  suggest  that wives’  and husbands’  years of 
schooling have no significant effect on the likelihood that children will be taken to a health 
care facility. 
Some of the occupation dummies for the  wife  show  a  significantly negative sign, 
implying  that if a wife is engaged in work, this tends to have unfavorable effects on   20 
children’s welfare.  A possible explanation is that working outside the home reduces 
mothers’ time for child care and household chores. For example, it is worth noting that a 
wife working as an agricultural laborer is associated with a greater likelihood of child 
death  and a wife working as a professional is associated with a reduced likelihood that she 
will take her children to a health care facility. These results suggest that the promotion of 
labor force participation of women does not always bring about benign effects for 
children’s welfare, even though it is often considered to be important for the empowerment 
of women. 
Next, household economic wealth (ASSETS) has no significant impact on CC but a 
significant negative effect on CD. This suggests that while an improvement in households’ 
economic situation tends to mitigate child mortality, it does not influence the likelihood of 
routine health care for children.   
The results presented above provide important implications for development policy 
making. First, they confirm that, as has often been pointed out, the promotion of female 
education and labor market participation contributes to greater female autonomy. Second, 
the results indicate that it is essential for development policy makers to take into account 
the household decision-making process, since female autonomy has a significant positive 
impact on CC. This suggests that non-unitary household models are more appropriate for 
devising  development policies, which is consistent with the conclusions of previous 
studies. 
Third, the results also showed that FA improved CC, while both wives’ and husbands’ 
years of schooling as well as household assets did not. On the other hand, FA did not have 
a significant favorable impact on CD, while wives’ and husbands’ years of schooling and 
household assets  did. This implies  that if the  policy  goal is to reduce  child mortality,   21 
policies aiming only at improvements in female autonomy may possibly fail to achieve the 
desired result. 
These findings here can be summarized as follows. While female autonomy has an 
important effect on routine health care  for children,  parents’ educational attainment -- 
likely through its effects on knowledge about health care – and household economic wealth 
significantly raise the probability of child survival.  Put another way, promoting female 
autonomy increases the likelihood that children will be taken to a health care facility. At the 
same time, however, no significant effect of female autonomy on child mortality was 
observed. That is, the probability of child survival is raised directly through factors such as 
wives’ and husbands’ educational attainment and household economic wealth rather than 
indirectly through female autonomy. In addition, while female labor market participation is 
likely to increase female autonomy, it may also negatively affect the likelihood of child 
health care visits and child mortality. This  suggests  that  children’s welfare may not be 
improved by a policy aiming only at enhancing female autonomy. More importantly, the 
results imply that if high child mortality is characteristic of early stages of development, the 
enhancement of female autonomy may be crucial at later stages of economic development. 
 
5. Conclusion 
The  aim  of this paper was to  examine  what  factors  contribute to enhancing female 
autonomy and how  female autonomy, in turn,  affects  household welfare through 
decision-making processes. Based on these objectives, the analysis focused on children’s 
welfare as an outcome of intra-household resource allocation, using an index of female 
autonomy constructed from the 1998/99 National Family Health Survey for India. Using a 
theoretical model of an asymmetric  Nash  bargaining  solution, an empirical model was   22 
derived in which female autonomy was considered to be a proxy for wives’ bargaining 
power  vis-à-vis  their  husbands. Furthermore, a simultaneous equations model was 
employed to take into account the possibility that female autonomy is affected by other 
exogenous factors. The results of the analysis can be summarized as follows. 
It  was found that promoting education  and labor market  participation  of women 
contributes  to female autonomy, which is a  major  component of the  empowerment of 
women. In addition, female autonomy has a significant positive effect on the likelihood 
that mothers will take their children to visit a health facility. These findings indicate that in 
devising development policies in India, it is necessary to work on the basis of  the 
assumption of non-unitary household models. They also mean that it is indispensable for 
policy-makers to pay attention to changes in intra-household resource allocation through 
improvements in female autonomy. 
It should, however, be noted that female autonomy does not appear to have a 
significant effect on child survival, implying that only promoting female autonomy in some 
cases is likely to be insufficient to improve children’s welfare. Similarly, both husbands’ and 
wives’ educational attainment, as well as household wealth, are positively correlated with 
child survival, but do not seem to affect the likelihood that a child will visit a medical 
facility.  The findings lead to the following conclusion:  female autonomy contributes 
directly  to  the likelihood that children will receive  routine health care, while the 
educational attainment of the mother or the father only has an indirect effect. However, 
greater female autonomy is not necessarily associated with a higher likelihood of child 
survival, although it does tend to raise the likelihood of routine health care for children. It 
is the promotion of wives’ and husbands’ knowledge about health issues and household 
economic wealth rather than female autonomy that directly have a favorable effect on the   23 
probability of child survival. This implies that it is essential to understand the channels 
through which development policies operate, because there may be cases where children’s 
welfare cannot be improved just by promoting female autonomy. More importantly, the 
results suggest that the enhancement of female autonomy may be less important at early 
stages of development but is likely to be crucial at later stages. In other words, it indicates 
that fostering female autonomy will play a crucial role in long-term development.   
Finally, several limitations of this paper should be mentioned. One possible problem 
is that the analysis did not include whether the wife or husband owned assets that yielded 
unearned income and that might affect the relative bargaining position in the household. A 
further limitation  is associated with extra-environmental parameters (EEPs)  that  might 
affect female autonomy. McElroy (1990) and Fuwa et al. (2006), for example, argued that 
there may be a significant relationship between the wealth and educational attainment of 
the  parents of a couple and the woman’s bargaining power  within the household.  The 
simple reason for these omissions is that the NFHS-2 did not include any such information. 
Yet another issue is that, as pointed out by Anderson and Eswaran (2009) and Basu (2006), 
there is likely to be a two-way relationship between labor market participation by women 
and female autonomy. In the context of this study, this would imply that female labor 
market participation is endogenous and this would have to be taken into account in the 
empirical analysis. These issues are left for future studies.   24 
References 
 
Anderson, S. and M. Eswaran, 2009. What Determines Female Autonomy? Evidence 
from Bangladesh. Journal of Development Economics, 90 (2), 179-191. 
Alderman, H., P. A. Chiappori, H. Lawrence, and J. Hoddinott, 1995. Unitary versus 
Collective Models of the Household: Is It Time to Shift the Burden of Proof? World 
Bank Research Observer, 10(1), 1-19. 
Bardhan, P., 1974. On Life and Death Questions. Economic and Political Weekly, 9(32-34), 
1293-1304. 
―――  1982.  Little  Girls  and  Death in India. Economic and Political Weekly,  17(36), 
1448-1450. 
Basu, K., 2006. Gender and Say: A Model of Household Behavior with Endogenously 
Determined Balance of Power. Economic Journal, 116(511), 558-580. 
Beaton, G. H. and H. Ghassemi, 1982. Supplementary Feeding Programs for Young 
Children in Developing Countries. American Journal of Clinical Nutrition, 35(Suppl. 
4), 863-916. 
Binmore, K., A. Rubinstein, and A. Wolinsky, 1986. The Nash Bargaining Solution in 
Economic Modelling. RAND Journal of Economics, 17(2), 176-188. 
Browning, M., F. Bourguignon, P. A. Chiappori, and V. Lechene,  1994. Income and 
Outcomes:  A  Structural Model of Intrahousehold Allocation. Journal of Political 
Economy, 102(6), 1067-1096. 
Das Gupta, M., 1987. Selective Discrimination in Rural Punjab, India. Population and 
Development Review, 13(1), 77-100. 
Dréze, J. and A. Sen, 2002. India Economic Development and Social Opportunity. Oxford: 
Oxford University Press. 
Dyson, T. and M. Moore,  1983. On Kinship Structure, Female Autonomy, and 
Demographic Behavior in India. Population and Development Review, 9(1), 35-60. 
Eswaran, M.,  2002.  The Empowerment of Women, Fertility, and Child Mortality: 
Towards a Theoretical Analysis. Journal of Population Economics, 15(3), 433-454. 
Fuwa, N., S. Ito, K. Kubo, T. Kurosaki, and Y. Sawada, 2006. Gender Discrimination,   25 
Intrahousehold Resource Allocation, and Importance of Spouses’ Fathers: Evidence 
on Household Expenditure from Rural India. Developing Economies, 44(4), 398-439. 
Government of India, 1993. Information, Education and Communication. Annual Report 
1992-1993 of the  Ministry of Health and Family Welfare. Delhi. 
http://mohfw.nic.in/reports/Performance%20Budget%201992_93/65.pdf. 
Haddad, L. and R. Kanbur,  1990.  How Serious is the Neglect of Intra-Household 
Inequality? Economic Journal, 100(402), 866-881. 
International Institute of Population Sciences (IIPS) and ORC Macro,  2000.  National 
Family Health Survey (NFHS-2), 1998-99. Mumbai. 
――――  2007. National Family Health Survey (NFHS-3), 2005-06. Mumbai. 
Jensen, R. and E. Oster, 2009. The Power of TV: Cable Television and Women’s Status in 
India. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 124(3), 1057-1094. 
Kantor, P., 2003. Women’s Empowerment Through Home-based Work: Evidence from 
India. Development and Change, 34(3), 425-445. 
Kishor, S., 1993. ’May God Give Sons to All’: Gender and Child Mortality in India. 
American Sociological Review, 58(2), 247-265. 
Lundberg, S., R. A. Pollak, and T. J. Wales, 1997. Do Husband and Wives Pool Their 
Resources? Evidence from the United Kingdom Child Benefit. Journal of Human 
Resources, 32(3), 463-480. 
McElroy, M. B., 1990. The Empirical Content of Nash-Bargained Household Behavior. 
Journal of Human Resources, 25(4), 559-583. 
Murthi, M., A.C. Guio and J. Dréze, 1995. Mortality, Fertility, and Gender Bias in India: 
A District-Level Analysis. Population and Development Review, 21(4), 745-782. 
Pitt, M. M. and M. R. Rosenzweig, 1990. Estimating the Intrahousehold Incidence of 
Illness: Child Health and Gender-Inequality in the Allocation of Time. International 
Economic Review, 31(4), 969-989. 
Pitt, M. M., M. R. Rosenzweig, and Md. N. Hassan, 1990. Productivity, Health, and 
Inequality in the Intrahousehold Distribution of Food in Low-Income Countries. 
American Economic Review, 80(5), 1139-1156. 
Qian, N., 2008. Missing Women and the Price of Tea in China: The Effect of Sex-specific   26 
Earnings on Sex Imbalance. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 123(3), 1251-1285. 
Rosenzweig, M. R. and T. P. Schultz, 1982. Market Opportunities, Genetic Endowments, 
and Intrafamily Resource Distribution: Child Survival in Rural India. American 
Economic Review, 72(4), 803-815. 
Schultz, P., 1990. Testing the Neoclassical Model of Family Labor Supply and Fertility. 
Journal of Human Resources, 25(4), 599-634. 
Sen, Amartya 1999. Development As Freedom. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Thomas, D.,  1990. Intra-Household Resource Allocation: An Inferential Approach. 
Journal of Human Resources, 25(4), 635-664. 
Udry, C., 1996. Gender, Agricultural Production, and the Theory of the Household. 
Journal of Political Economy, 104(5), 1010-1046. 
Van der Klaauw, B. and L. Wang, 2004. Child Mortality in Rural India. World Bank 
Policy Research Working Paper, 3281.   27 




All India 3.89 (2.04)
All India (rural) 3.63 (2.00)






Haryana 4.57 (1.63) Assam 3.28 (1.66)
Himachal Pradesh 5.41 (1.40) Manipur 4.17 (1.68)
Jammu & Kashmir 3.28 (1.84) Meghalaya 5.09 (1.76)
Punjab 5.08 (1.64) Mizoram 5.24 (1.82)
Rajasthan 2.82 (1.81) Nagaland 4.17 (1.43)
Delhi 4.04 (1.79) Sikkim 4.33 (1.72)
Arunachal Pradesh 5.10 (1.62)
Central
Madhya Pradesh 2.74 (1.77) West
Uttar Pradesh 2.85 (1.89) Goa 5.05 (1.73)
Gujarat 4.46 (1.99)
East Maharashtra 3.54 (1.95)
Bihar 3.32 (1.95)
Orrisa 3.25 (1.84) South
West Bengal 3.03 (2.00) Andhra Pradesh 3.57 (1.76)
Karnataka 3.58 (1.99)
Kerala 4.39 (1.99)
Tamil Nadu 5.01 (1.78)
Note: Figures shown are for rural areas in each state.   28 
Table 2. Description of variables used in the empirical analysis 




CD (whether the wife has had at least one dead child) 
CC (whether the wife has taken her children at least once to a medical facility to get any kind 
of health care during the last 12 months) 
Endogenous regressor 
FA (female autonomy) 
Characteristics 
of household 
Individual characteristics of wife and husband 
Wife’s age, Husband’s age, Wife’s schooling years, Husband’s schooling years, Wife’s age at 
first marriage 
Occupation dummies of wife and husband 
Professional, Clerical, Sales, Cultivator, Agricultural laborer, House keeper, Service, Skilled 
laborer, Unskilled laborer 
Religion and caste 
Muslim, Christian, SC/ST (scheduled caste and tribe), OBC (other backward caste) 
Other household characteristics 
ASSETS (an index of household economic wealth, ranging from 1 to 61 calculated based on the 
methodology for Standard Living Index of the NFHS-2) 
HF Worker (whether a health or family planning worker had visited the household during the 
last 12 months)   
MEDIA-HEALTH  (whether the wife had either watched TV programs or listened to radio 
programs about family planning during the last month) 
MEDIA (whether the wife had the opportunity to either watch TV or listen to the radio at least 
once a week) 
Number of children (number of children that a  wife has given birth to),  Number of adult 
males, Number of adult females 
Socio-economic 
characteristics 
Town (distance to the nearest town), District (distance to the district office), Station (distance to 
the nearest railway station), Other Transport  (distance to other transportation networks), 
Paved Road (distance to paved road), Primary (distance to primary school), Middle (distance 
to middle school), Secondary (distance to secondary school), Higher Secondary (distance to 
higher secondary school), College  (distance to college), Health  (distance to health center), 
Sub-Center (distance to health sub-center), Primary Health (distance to primary health center), 
Community Health  (distance to community health center),  Gov. Dispensary  (distance to 
government dispensary),  Gov. Hospital  (distance to government hospital),  Private Clinic 
(distance to private clinic), Private Hospital (distance to private hospital), Post Office (distance 
to post office), Telegraph (distance to telegraph office), STD (distance to STD booth), Bank 
(distance to bank), Village Private (availability of private doctor), Visiting Dr. (availability of 
visiting doctor), VHG (availability of village health guide), Dai (availability of traditional birth 
attendant), Mobile Health (availability of mobile health unit), M/SSI (availability of mills/small 
scale industries), CCS  (availability of credit cooperative society),  ACS  (availability of 
agricultural cooperative society), MCS  (availability of milk cooperative society), K/GMS 
(availability of Kirana/General Market Shop), Weekly Market (availability of weekly market), 
Fair Prices Shop (availability of fair prices shop), Paan (availability of Paan shop), Pharmacy 
(availability of pharmacy), Mahila (availability of Mahila Mandal), Youth (availability of youth 
club),  Anganwadi  (availability of Anganwadi center), Community Center  (availability of 
community center), IRDP  (number of beneficiaries of Integrated  Rural  Development 
Programme),  NREP  (number of beneficiaries of National Rural Employment Programme), 
TRYSEM  (number of beneficiaries of Training of Rural Youth for Self-Employment),  EGS 
(number of beneficiaries of Employment  Guarantee  Scheme),  DWARCA  (number of 
beneficiaries of Development of Women and Children of Rural Areas),  IAY  (number of 
beneficiaries of Indira Awas Yojana),  SGNY  (number of beneficiaries of Sanjay Gandhi 
Niradhar Yojana), TV (availability of community television set), TTV (total number of 
television sets in village) 
Others  State dummies 
Note: Estimation results for the socio-economic variables and the state dummies (74 variables in 
total) are not reported to save space.   29 
Table 3. Summary statistics of main variables   
Standard
Variables Obs Mean Deviation Min Max
Dependent variables
CD 51,023 0.275 0.446 0 1
CC 31,866 0.309 0.462 0 1
Endogenous regressor
FA 51,023 3.592 1.946 0 8
Individual characteristics
Wife's age 51,023 31.530 8.339 15 49
Husband's age 51,023 37.565 9.583 15 97
Wife's schooling years 51,023 2.585 3.824 0 22
Husband's schooling years 51,023 5.395 4.745 0 30
Wife's age at first marriage 51,023 16.781 3.022 12 44

























ASSETS 51,023 19.693 9.406 1 61
HF worker 51,023 0.126 0.332 0 1
MEDIA-HEALTH 51,023 0.477 0.499 0 1
MEDIA 51,023 0.494 0.500 0 1
Number of children 51,023 0.728 0.811 0 4
Number of adult males 51,023 1.922 1.282 0 13
Number of adult females 51,023 1.983 1.208 1 13
Note:  Summary statistics for the socio-economic variables and the state 
dummies are not reported to save space.   30 
Table 4. Estimation result for female autonomy (FA) 
FA Coefficient (Z-value) Coefficient (Z-value)
Individual characteristics
Wife's age 0.020 (9.83)*** 0.021 (10.35)***
Husband's age 0.004 (2.41)** 0.004 (2.41)**
Wife's schooling years 0.036 (12.18)*** 0.043 (14.87)***
Husband's schooling years 0.001 (0.29) 0.005 (2.21)**
Wife's age at first marriage -0.002 (-0.59) -0.001 (-0.45)





Wife-Agricultural laborer 0.217 (7.48)***
Wife-House keeper 0.537 (4.29)***
Wife-Service 0.439 (2.33)**
Wife-Skilled laborer 0.236 (5.47)***





Husband-Agricultural laborer -0.266 (-5.34)***
Husband-House keeper -0.086 (-0.48)
Husband-Service 0.216 (3.73)***
Husband-Skilled laborer -0.015 (-0.32)
Husband-Unskilled laborer -0.089 (-1.77)*
Religion and caste (reference = other Hindu)
Muslim -0.212 (-7.29)*** -0.187 (-6.47)***
Christian 0.152 (3.23)*** 0.164 (3.48)***
SC/ST 0.015 (0.68) 0.062 (2.85)***
OBC -0.004 (-0.18) 0.019 (0.93)
Other household characteristics
ASSETS 0.006 (4.59)*** 0.004 (3.11)***
HF worker 0.143 (5.79)*** 0.142 (5.73)***
MEDIA-HEALTH 0.163 (7.95)*** 0.173 (8.44)***
MEDIA 0.075 (3.5)*** 0.092 (4.29)***
Number of children 0.018 (1.56) 0.010 (0.85)
Number of adult males -0.064 (-8.64)*** -0.074 (-10.01)***
Number of adult females -0.090 (-11.34)*** -0.090 (-11.35)***
Note1: * Significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.  To save 
space only the results for CD are reported and coefficient estimates for the 
socio-economic variables and state dummies are omitted.     31 
Table 5. Estimation result for CD 
CD dy/dx (Z-value) dy/dx (Z-value)
FA -0.033 (-0.14) -0.045 (-0.24)
Individual characteristics
Wife's age 0.041 (9.67)*** 0.041 (11.9)***
Husband's age -0.001 (-0.87) -0.002 (-1.14)
Wife's schooling years -0.018 (-2)** -0.018 (-2.04)**
Husband's schooling years -0.016 (-8.5)*** -0.016 (-7.53)***
Wife's age at first marriage -0.059 (-21.28)*** -0.059 (-20.55)***





Wife-Agricultural laborer 0.055 (1)
Wife-House keeper -0.028 (-0.17)
Wife-Service -0.037 (-0.19)
Wife-Skilled laborer 0.053 (0.81)





Husband-Agricultural laborer 0.082 (1.08)
Husband-House keeper 0.218 (1.49)
Husband-Service 0.094 (1.34)
Husband-Skilled laborer 0.120 (2.99)***
Husband-Unskilled laborer 0.119 (2.5)**
Religion and caste (reference = other Hindu)
Muslim 0.036 (0.64) 0.029 (0.67)
Christian 0.013 (0.23) 0.019 (0.37)
SC/ST 0.079 (4.41)*** 0.087 (4.29)***
OBC 0.038 (2.17)** 0.043 (2.45)**
Other household characteristics
ASSETS -0.008 (-3.92)*** -0.008 (-5.11)***
HF worker 0.044 (1.15) 0.046 (1.4)
MEDIA-HEALTH -0.038 (-0.78) -0.039 (-0.89)
Number of children -0.004 (-0.35) -0.006 (-0.57)
Number of adult males -0.033 (-2.08)** -0.035 (-2.37)**




-126308.000 -126572.470  
Note : * Significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. Coefficient 
estimates for the socio-economic variables and the state dummies are not reported 
to save space.   32 
Table 6. Estimation result for CC 
CC dy/dx (Z-value) dy/dx (Z-value)
FA 0.386 (2.61)*** 0.362 (2.78)***
Individual characteristics
Wife's age -0.016 (-7.82)*** -0.016 (-7.38)***
Husband's age -0.004 (-2.81)*** -0.005 (-2.82)***
Wife's schooling years -0.008 (-1) -0.010 (-1.25)
Husband's schooling years -0.001 (-0.57) -0.002 (-1.22)
Wife's age at first marriage 0.007 (2.02)** 0.007 (2.09)**





Wife-Agricultural laborer -0.027 (-0.64)
Wife-House keeper -0.045 (-0.24)
Wife-Service -0.343 (-1.43)
Wife-Skilled laborer -0.047 (-0.95)





Husband-Agricultural laborer 0.131 (2.73)***
Husband-House keeper 0.274 (1.59)
Husband-Service -0.027 (-0.34)
Husband-Skilled laborer 0.033 (0.57)
Husband-Unskilled laborer 0.072 (1.36)
Religion and caste (reference = other Hindu)
Muslim 0.097 (2.39)** 0.087 (2.55)**
Christian -0.003 (-0.06) 0.007 (0.13)
SC/ST -0.009 (-0.45) -0.012 (-0.59)
OBC 0.006 (0.31) 0.005 (0.25)
Other household characteristics
ASSETS 0.001 (0.37) 0.001 (0.51)
HF worker -0.008 (-0.17) -0.002 (-0.04)
MEDIA-HEALTH 0.004 (0.07) 0.008 (0.15)
Number of children 0.122 (3.09)*** 0.128 (4.08)***
Number of adult males 0.004 (0.23) 0.003 (0.18)




-80447.580 -80593.974  
 Note : * Significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. Coefficient 
estimates for the socio-economic variables and the state dummies  are not 
reported to save space. 
 